Trade Unions and Industrial Injury in Great Britain by A. S. Litwin
Abstract
Anecdotal evidence suggests that trade unions succeed in ameliorating workplace health and safety,
but no attempt has been made to link specific workplace injury rates with a respective union
presence.   Relying on WERS98, this paper establishes a cross-sectional link between trade unions
and occupational injury rates, revealing that unions gravitate to accident-prone workplaces and react
by reducing injury rates within these types of employment units.  However, the ability for unions to
reduce injury rates does not appear to increase monotonically as they progress along a workplace
instrumentality continuum from recognition alone to a pre-entry closed shop.
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… the United Society of Boilermakers has insisted, in its elaborate agreement with the
Ship Repairers’ Federation of the United Kingdom, upon the following clause: “The
employers undertake that, before men are put to work on [repairing the great tank
ships for carrying petroleum in bulk, in which dangerous vapour accumulates], an
expert’s certificate shall be obtained daily to the effect that the tanks are absolutely
safe.  Such certificate to be posted in some conspicuous place.”  Innumerable other
regulations aim at the removal of conditions injurious to the workers’ health.  Thus,
the various Trade Unions of “ovenmen” (potters) have for a whole generation
protested against being forced to empty the ovens before these have been allowed to
grow cool, on the express ground that this unnecessary exposure to a temperature
between 170 and 210 degrees Fahrenheit is seriously detrimental to health.  Several
strikes have taken place solely on this point, and the Staffordshire Ovenmen’s Union
now has a by-law authorising the support of any member who is dismissed for
refusing to work in a temperature higher than 120 degrees.  (Webb and Webb, 1897:
358)
Thus, the birth of an historical expectation that trade unions embrace workplace health and
safety as a fundamental responsibility.  Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1897) provided one of the
earliest descriptions of the means by which trade unions reduce the number of accidents in
the workplace, including lobbying for safety legislation and making workplace hazards more
costly to employers by raising the tacit risk premia embedded in wages, i.e. compensating
wage differentials.  Unions also take direct action on the shop floor to make the workplace
safer.
More recently, the nationalisation of Britain’s railways, ardently supported by the
National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and by the Trades Union Congress (TUC), led to a
reduction in both the number and proportion of railway staff sustaining fatal accidents
(Bagwell, 1982).  British Rail’s safety record for non-fatal injuries in 1978, the approximate
peak of trade union power in the UK, also compared well with that of the other 14 countries
sending returns to the International Union of Railways (UIC).  Injury reduction came as no
surprise to the labour movement, as the amelioration of health and safety topped its pro-
nationalisation rhetoric since as early as 1894.  This outcome suggests that surplus profits,
generated by product market monopoly in this instance, can be transferred from capital to
labour not only in the form of a union wage mark-up, but also via an improvement in the
conditions under which work is undertaken.
Even today, the expectation of a negative relationship between occupational injury
rates and a trade union presence remains firmly fixed.  The electricians working on the
extension of London Underground’s Jubilee Line, relying on their favourable Marshallian
conditions, went on strike in order to express concern over health and safety issues (Milne,2
1998; Steel, 1998).  Furthermore, the sectoral shift from goods to services only reinforces the
need for an institutional force to balance management’s demands with labour’s safety.  While
it may initially appear counterintuitive, since we tend to imagine injuries occurring in coal
mines and on assembly lines, Toon (1993) points out that the restaurant industry ranks among
those with the largest number of occupational injuries in the U.S.  It alone accounts for 5% of
all on-the-job injuries nationwide.  Injuries include slips and falls, lacerations, and punctures.
Workers in the hotel industry also incur injuries from lifting, bending, reaching, twisting, and
needle sticks.  Delivery drivers in various industries suffer musculoskeletal injuries
associated with repetition and rapidly rising productivity standards.  Grocery store clerks
suffer disproportionately from wrist injuries and upper extremity injuries associated with
poor till design—twisting the wrist to scan horizontally and reaching up to weigh produce.
According to Toon (1993), members of the Food and Commercial Workers Union and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters have worked with employers to advance workplace
ergonomics, particularly in situations where changes were not aligned with short-term profit
maximisation.
This anecdotal evidence, then, propounds a more rigorous test of organised labour’s
ability to make workplaces safer.  Should the anecdotal evidence translate into statistical
substantiation, the proposed model will reveal an unmeasured cost of the decay of labour’s
collective institutions.  Conversely, should unions fail to demonstrate a negative impact on
injury rates, the model will serve as one more arrow in the quiver of those that believe trade
unions have outlived their usefulness.  Toward these ends, the next section will delineate the
hypotheses that the model will test, including a review of the research already done in this
area and a list of crucial control variables that will allow for the isolation of a union impact
on injury rates.  Section 3 will describe the underlying data set, the Workplace Employee
Relations Survey (WERS98), and the statistical methods applied to it.  In Section 4, I will
present the results of the initial attempt to model workplace injury rates, as well as a brief
foray into “de-layering” the workplace union variable.  From this, the model will yield
implications for those considering the contemporary role of trade unions.  Finally, Section 5
will provide conclusions.
2. Hypotheses
Historical and neoteric accounts together provide an initial anecdotal expectation of a
negative cross-Sectional relationship between trade unions and occupational injury.  Nichols
(e.g. 1990, 1994, 1997), however, has used this evidence as seed for theory.  He has
intensively studied industrial injury and its correlates, using the Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS3) to unearth linkages to industrial injury for variables such as health
and safety legislation, health and safety arrangements (e.g. the presence of health and safety
joint consultative committees at the workplace), workplace size, and most notably, trade
unionism.  The hypotheses outlined below will capture many of his findings.
Reilly  et al. (1995) also rely on WIRS3 to focus specifically on workplace
arrangements for health and safety determination.  They apply eight binary variables to assess
the effect of union participation in health and safety determination upon the natural logarithm
of the injury rate.  The weakest form of union determination occurs when management deals
with health and safety matters without any form of worker consultation.  On the other end of
the union involvement continuum, unions choose  all employee representatives for a
management and labour joint consultative committee (JCC) that deals  exclusively with
matters of health and safety.  Similarly, Weil (1999) sought to determine whether U.S. labour3
unions were complements or substitutes with more novel forms of employee representation,
particularly in regard to enforcement of policies prescribed by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA).  Both Reilly et al. (1995) and Weil (1999) demonstrate that
trade unions supplement the effectiveness of other institutions intended to make the
workplace safer.
The model presented in this paper will explain workplace injury rates as a function of
an array of explanatory variables.  The dependent variable will be the number of employees
who have sustained any type of eight listed injuries during working hours over the last 12
months, divided by the sum of full-time and part-time workers employed at the workplace.
Listed injuries include bone fractures, burns, amputations, and any injury that results in
immediate hospitalisation for more than 24 hours.  Since this calculation is distributed log-
normally across workplaces where injuries occurred, the equation will take the natural
logarithm of the LHS variable, allowing us to interpret all partial slopes as percentage
changes in the dependent variable resulting from marginal changes in any one of the
independent variables.
Based on the longitudinal work by Nichols and evidence provided by the Webbs and
the Jubilee Line electricians, among others, this paper broadly hypothesises a negative, cross-
sectional relationship between trade unions and rates of injury at their respective workplaces.
Once the vector of control variables is in place, a unionised workplace should be expected to
have a lower rate of injury, ceteris paribus.  As explained by the Webbs, unions will increase
risk premia, take direct action at the workplace, and remove health and safety provisions from
competition by lobbying for universal regulations.  Trade unions can also play a key role in
training workers about risk reduction, training which may be general enough in nature such
that employers would otherwise not choose to fund it.  Besides being more committed to
workers’ welfare than management, unions have the capacity to improve industrial health and
safety in ways that individual workers do not have at their disposal, namely through the
union’s power and resources to command greater knowledge of workplace risk (Nichols,
1997).  Trade unions can also crack the public goods problem associated with research into
health and safety that may typically be forgone due to the inappropriability of the resulting
information.  After collecting and interpreting this information, unions apply their findings to
the bargaining and enforcement of health and safety provisions in collective agreements.
Unions may also direct their power toward obtaining contractual guarantees against
dismissal, which allow workers to exercise their rights under the law.  This ground level
institutionalisation of “voice” over “exit” will lower injury rates, as “trouble makers” will be
listened to rather than banished, thus preventing similarly caused injuries from recurring.
Unions also work to correct distortions arising from unequal bargaining power between
labour and management, an inequality that limits an individual worker’s labour market
mobility ( Schurman  et al, 1998).  This lack of mobility further renders market-based
solutions implausible.
However, unions also process information on industrial safety in ways that could
offset the negative relationship between variables of workplace union power and injury rates,
signalled by the paltry magnitude of the accident rate correlation coefficient in Table 1.  First,
if unions bargain for safety by raising compensating wage differentials above what they
would be in a non-union firm, as demonstrated by Thaler and Rosen (1975), the short run will
not give rise to a reduction in accident rates.  While conventional market wisdom suggests
that competition will force management to reduce injuries and wage differentials once capital
is no longer fixed, neo-classical economic assumptions may be inapplicable, as unions tend to
remain powerful where product markets are quite concentrated (Metcalf, 1993).  Second,
unions formalise grievance procedures which will yield, ceteris paribus, a greater number of4
reported injuries ( e.g. Krueger and Burton, 1990).  Such grievance procedures work to
prevent management from “fudging” the injury data downward and to increase the likelihood
that an employee will report his or her injury, as he knows he will be protected from
dismissal and expects the injurious situation to be remedied.  Third, Nichols (1997) reminds
us that “it is not trade unions that call forth unsafe working conditions, but rather unsafe
working conditions that call forth trade unions” (151).  Workers who belong to trade unions
will have more hazardous jobs than those who do not belong to trade unions.  And, Kochan
(1979) adds that workers exposed to physical hazards in the workplace are more likely to
vote for union recognition.
Allowing this prior research to direct the arrow of causality, Table 1 proposes that
accident-prone workplaces beckon trade unions and that trade unions respond by reducing the
rates of injury within these workplaces.  This forces us to hypothesise, paradoxically, that
unions will be recognised where injuries are more likely to occur, but will correlate
negatively with injury rates within these types of workplaces.  As will be justified in the
following section, the OLS model, then, will only predict injury rates where injuries occur.
The developed model will isolate many of these offsetting issues through RHS control
variables.  First, the model will control for the vintage of the workplace by taking account of
the number of years it has been at its current and previous addresses.  Typically, older
workplaces house antiquated capital and complacent managers.  Thus, the variable should
enter the model with a positive coefficient, though likely to have a minute effect on the
dependent variable.  The magnitude and significance of a vintage control variable would be
greater when it characterises the entire organisation as opposed to when it only characterises
the individual workplace, as health and safety policy is likely to be promulgated from above.
Nevertheless, trade unions tend to survive in older workplaces, rendering it crucial that we
separate union effects upon injury rates from vintage effects upon the same.
The model will also control for the male percentage of the workplace labour force.
Since males disproportionately compose trade union membership on a macro level, this
control erodes at the conflation between union effects and gender effects.  Reilly et al. (1995)
found that the percentage of female workers in the employment unit exerts a statistically
significant negative effect on the log-odds of an injury, believing that females tend to
undertake occupations involving less physical effort and thus, less opportunity for occurrence
of injury.  Our model, then, should find, particularly at the highest levels of gender inequity
in workplace employment, a positive relationship between the male fraction of the labour
force and the natural log of injury rates.
The size of the employment unit, defined as the number of full-time and part-time
workers it comprises, consistently provides a statistically significant control variable for any
union-related dependent variable.  Conventional wisdom implies that size controls should
carry positive coefficients when predicting injury rates, as we typically imagine accidents
occurring in large plants, not in corner shops.  However, Nichols (1997) found that smaller
employment units have, on average, a higher rate of injury.  This robust relationship holds
even when he defines the entity as the entire firm to which the workplace belongs, as smaller
workplaces in smaller firms have the worst safety records.  Reilly et al. (1995) confirm and
strengthen this result in their study of safety committees, where the magnitude of the
estimated employment size coefficient is considerably greater in absolute terms than that of
any of the other workforce composition variables.  This prediction for the proposed model
underlines the fixed-cost nature of reducing risk at the workplace—greater size facilitates the
development of management safety resources such as purchases of new capital and
investments in more safety-specialist knowledge.  Of course, due to the similar fixed-cost
intensity of union organising, unions tend to be rooted where the potential membership base5
is plentiful.  Consequently, controlling for workplace size allows for the separation of union
efforts to reduce injury rates from the effect that size alone has on the dependent variable.
Still, the variables controlling for workplace size should significantly reduce log injury rates.
The injury model will also control for the climate of collective bargaining at the
workplace.  Toward this goal, the regression will include one subjective exogenous binary
variable set to equal one in cases where the manager respondent has stated that management
at the establishment generally opposes union membership amongst its employees.  Including
one such subjective variable provides an opportunity for “tasting” the effects of subjective
explanations for workplace injury.  One would predict the variable’s coefficient to be weakly
positive, as such a value would signal that lack of labour-management co-operation could
prevent the valuable interchange of health and safety information.  Moreover, one would
expect the injury rate to be lower in workplaces that have had industrial action in the last five
years, as the heightened legitimacy of the “nuclear threat” forces management to take safety
matters more seriously than it might otherwise.
The findings of Reilly et al. (1995) and Weil (1999) propound that we separate the
effects of health and safety committees and JCCs from the effects of the variables of
workplace union strength.  The former provided a rigorous test of the injury effects of such
committees, concluding that they are strongly negative, and of increasing magnitude based on
their level of union involvement.  Finally, the model will control for industry effects by
employing single digit industrial classifications and applying manufacturing as a base case.
Assuming technology is distributed randomly across workplaces within an industry, this will
also allow some control for technology without necessitating reliance on detailed industry
dummies that could desensitise other coefficients to changes in injury rates.
Once the model establishes a link between trade unions and accident rates, I will
make an initial attempt to unmask the effects of different levels of union presence in the
workplace—recognition alone, high density, post-entry closed shop, and pre-entry closed
shop—on injury rates.  Disaggregation will allow us to better link specific institutions with
injury rate outcomes.  The model should reveal incremental reductions in log injury rates
based upon the proxies for step-wise increases in union power at the workplace.  In other




My information comes from the fourth (1998) Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS98), known as the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) in its previous
three administrations.  (See Cully et al. (1998) for a concise, but thorough description of the
design and conduct of the survey.)  WERS98 is interviews-based, collecting information from
2,191 British workplaces with 10 or more workers, making it the largest survey of industrial
relations practices of its kind.  The response rate was 80%.  All information in this study
came from the manager respondent responsible for personnel matters.  That Nichols (1990,
1994, 1997) and Reilly et al. (1995) relied on ancestral data sets to the one employed in this
paper, coupled with the fact that WERS98 samples a population representing all but a quarter
of British workers (Cully  et al., 1 998) lends credence to comparisons and incremental
conclusions related to the general issue of trade unions and accident rates.6
Methods
The most statistically transparent method for modelling injury rates necessitates an OLS
equation, where injury rates are regressed on a binary union variable and the aforementioned
array of control variables.  However, the nearly perfect log-normality of the distribution of
injury rates obtains in part due to the undefined nature of the natural log of zero.  In the 1,366
(62%) workplaces where no injuries occurred, the numerator of the injury rate fraction
occasions the entire observation be dropped from the OLS prediction, meaning the regression
analysis only predicts injury rates where injuries occur.  In an effort to keep the quantitative
analysis as pellucid as possible, the model employs a converted probit to predict the
likelihood of injury occurring at a given workplace.  Then, in cases where a workplace has
not eliminated all instances of injury, the OLS predicts injury rates.  This convention
facilitates our testing the hypothesis evoked by Table 1, that accident-prone workplaces
summon collectivisation and that trade unions respond by reducing the rates of injury within
these workplaces.  This method also “raises the bar” for rejecting the null hypothesis, since
unions that succeed in eliminating all workplace injuries will not have the opportunity to
“represent the union cause” in the OLS equation.
While the complete sample comprises 2,191 observations, this model relies on
considerably fewer.  Besides the dropping of the zero-injury observations, additional
workplaces drop out of the analysis due to missing values assigned to two of their
explanatory variables.  The variable constructed to account for union recognition drops 40
observations, which can be considered randomly distributed across the workplaces surveyed.
The variable assembled to assess the vintage of the workplace sums two WERS98 variables
where both were available or when survey routing allowed a naught value to be assumed
equal to zero.  In cases where respondents simply were not certain of how long an
employment unit had been at its current or previous address, the analysis dropped the
observation, which occurred 551 times.  Unlike the recognition variable, the vintage variable
will more likely be dropped in cases in which its value is relatively high, just when it is
predicted to most increase injury rates.  Thus, missing values for this variable will soften the
significance of the vintage variable and decay at its effect on the coefficient of determination.
4. Results and Implications
Overall model
Tables 2 and 3 capture the results of the probit and OLS, explaining 33% of the variance in
injury rates where injuries occur.  The partial slopes in the converted probit (Table 2) can be
interpreted as the additional likelihood of injury occurring for a single unit increase in the
case of the continuous variable reflecting industrial vintage, or resulting from a change in
designation from zero to one for any of the binary variables.  Likewise, the coefficients in the
OLS equation (Table 3) signify the percentage change in log injury rates for single unit
increases in industrial vintage or a movement from zero to one for any dummy variable,
relative to the base case where noted.
The results of the statistical analysis sustain the hypothesis articulated above.  High
incidence of injury in the workplace appears to prompt collectivisation, as a union presence
in the workplace increases the likelihood of injury by about 8%, significant at the 1% level.
However, in these same types of workplaces, unions succeed in reducing log injury rates by
almost a quarter, significant at the 5% level.  Consequently, when coupled with the anecdotal7
evidence, the model rejects the null hypothesis that trade unions fail at reducing injury rates.
The model also strengthens the proposed link, bolstering the injury-reduction power of trade
unions, by allowing us to control for many of the other workplace factors that themselves
affect injury rates.
Workplace vintage positively and significantly forecasts the likelihood of injury
occurring at the workplace, as well as the injury rate.  While both coefficients are statistically
significant, their magnitudes are trifling.  As noted above, the absolute value of the partial
slopes representing the vintage control variable would be greater if the variable measured the
vintage of the entire organisation rather than only its member workplace, as health and safety
policy may be dictated by headquarters.
Only when males compose over 2/3 of the labour force does the gender imbalance
yield greater likelihood of injury occurring.  And even then, the same cannot be said
definitively of a positive gender effect where injuries still occur.  However, the presence of a
supermajority of males where accidents do occur appears to increase injury rates.  This
presents an instructive and illuminative comparison to the union variable.  As mentioned
above, accidents call forth trade unions, and trade unions react by organising to reduce
accident rates.  But, while males may gravitate to more dangerous workplaces, their mere
presence does nothing to reduce accident rates.  This squares with the model’s predictions
regarding unionism by rejecting another potential mechanism that could be reducing accident
rates.
Workplace size controls offer another powerful result, though quite comparable to the
findings regarding variables of union strength.  As conventional wisdom assumes, workplace
size associates positively with workplace accident rates.  In other words, we are correct to
envisage accidents occurring in expansive workplaces, as a workplace employing more than
50 workers has a 26% greater likelihood of injury occurring.  However, a “mile-long” payroll
equips larger workplaces with the fixed-cost advantages to reduce log injury rates by an
estimated 176%.  While the OLS separates union effects from size effects, note that larger
workplaces also offer trade unions fixed-cost advantages to organising.
The controls for collective bargaining climate exert little influence on accident rates.
The insignificance of the single, subjective attempt to predict these rates does support our
attempt to predict injury rates through objectively measurable determinants, which lends
assurance to the “science” of injury rate prediction.  The partial slopes of the industrial action
variable imply that strikes and slow-downs serve as efficacious union tools for reducing
workplace injuries.  While industrial action associates positively with the likelihood of injury
occurring, it appears, not surprisingly, to reduce injury rates where injuries occur, just
missing the mark for statistical significance in both cases.
Health and safety determination also seems to affect accident rates in much the same
way unions do.  Both proxies positively predict the likelihood of an accident, with health and
safety JCCs significant even at the 1% level.  However, the same proxies enter the regression
equation negatively, implying that these committees react by reducing injury rates.  The
effects of committee discussion and of JCCs cannot be regarded as conclusively as those
regarding unionism generally, since the former are not significant in the regression output.
However, present results square with Reilly et al.’s (1995) conclusions regarding health and
safety determination.
Finally, seven of the eleven industry dummies exert a significant effect on the
likelihood of injury.  Only the variable representing hotels and restaurants yields a curious
result.  While this may seem counterintuitive at first, recall that Toon (1993) found similar
results in the U.S., dismissing the myth that service sector unions need not concern
themselves with issues of occupational safety.  Interestingly, six of the industry dummies8
undergo a change of sign between the probit and OLS equations, again indicating a marked
difference between industry effects when predicting injury likelihood compared with industry
effects when predicting actual injury rates where injuries occur.
Union instrumentality model
The binary variable representing a union presence at the establishment facilitates a
transparent linkage between trade unions and injury rates, but potentially masks the huge
assumed instrumentality differences between unions that barely succeed in achieving
recognition versus those that have a firmly-entrenched pre-entry closed shop.  Though either
would flag the binary variable equal to one, the latter should presumably have more resources
at its disposal for reducing injury rates, or “tightening the reigns” on the governance of
production processes.  In order to safeguard against this conflation, I constructed a model just
like the previous one, except in its treatment of the trade union variable.  Hypothesising
monotonic increases in coefficient magnitude, I divided the union variable into four separate
binary variables—recognition, density in excess of 80%, post-entry closed shop, and pre-
entry closed shop.
As Tables 4 and 5 illustrate, the hypothesis of an increased ability for unions to reduce
accident rates as they progress along the instrumentality continuum does not quite pass
muster.  Instead, variables of instrumentality increase almost monotonically in their strength
at predicting the likelihood of an accident occurring at the workplace.  Only the pre-entry
closed shop reduces the likelihood of injury occurring, though this result is likely due to
chance.  Interestingly, the OLS reveals that in the absence of either form of closed shop, high
density increases injury rates where injuries occur.  Density in excess of 80% of the
employment unit more than doubles log injury rates relative to workplaces where there are no
recognised unions.  However, a pre-entry closed shop, the most “encompassing” form of
unionism, reduces log injury rates by over 140%, fully offsetting the positive injury rate
effects of high density in the absence of a closed shop.  A post-entry closed shop also yields a
negative impact on workplace injury rates, though the coefficient is not significantly different
from zero.
Consequently, the model does not reveal the predicted monotonic incremental reductions in
log injury rates based upon the proxies for step-wise increases in union power at the
workplace, even after the model captures the array of control variables.  Instead, the model
proffers a cosine wave-shaped relationship between accident rates and trade union strength in
the workplace.  Where injuries occur, a bit of union power—exemplified by recognition—
reduces injury rates.  However, increasing union strength in the workplace beyond
recognition alone achieves no incremental reduction in accident rates, until unions achieve
the highest level of workplace strength—the pre-entry closed shop.  At the apex of union
power, collectivism again works to significantly reduce accident rates.
Implications
Trade unions impact upon the likelihood of workplace injuries and the level of workplace
injury rates in opposing directions, rendering a conundrum for those attempting to glean
implications from the model.  The most intelligible method, then, for clarifying the
ramifications of the model will involve the  conventionalisation of a pair of stereotypical
union and non-union workers.  The archetypes in Table 6 evolve from the information
provided in the model, from which we determined the probability of injury and the number of
injuries per thousand workers.9
Regarding the union status of workers, the most revealing comparison will be
between non-union workers and members of a pre-entry closed shop.  These polar opposite
cases form the foundation of the inter-worker comparison.  The comparison will also capture
the plausible assumption that vestiges of unionism remain mostly in older workplaces, and
that non-union workers function in disproportionately newer workplaces.  Likewise, one
envisages union workers labouring in large, male-intensive workplaces, with non-union
counterparts working in smaller, more female-intensive employment units.  A poor,
adversarial IR climate imbues the union shop, though health and safety must be assumed to
be co-determined by labour and management.  The opposite holds for the non-union shop.
Specifically, the union worker labours in a pre-entry closed shop in a  50 year old
workplace that is over 2/3 male.  The workplace, in the manufacturing sector, has more than
50 workers and a poor IR climate, characterised by management’s negative attitude toward
trade unionism amongst its employees and industrial action having taken place in the last five
years.  Discussions over health and safety take place by committee and via JCC.  Note that
this stylised worker does not represent the safest or most dangerous characteristics that a
worker could embody, as the aim is not to create a worker with high probability of injury.  If
that were the goal, this worker would be in a small workplace, for example.  Instead, he
captures the stereotype of what policymakers or lay people would consider a “union worker.”
Likewise, the non-union worker, in the financial services sector, toils  in a two year-old
workplace, where there are no recognised unions.  The employment unit consists of less than
25 workers, over 2/3 of which are female.  Management attitude towards trade unionism is
equivocal, and health and safety standards arise without discussion by committee or JCC.
Non-union workers have not taken industrial action over this or any other issues in the last
five years.
In order to vivify this explanation, we can assume the union and non-union workers
are an assembly-line worker and a merchant banker, respectively.  Note that the union worker
is more likely to be injured, though the actual frequency of injury for union workers appears
markedly less where injuries occur.  This result bears no astonishment at this point, but
facilitates interpretation.
The non-union merchant banker faces just a 2% chance of sustaining injury,
compared with his or her union counterpart, an assembly line worker, who has a 58% of
sustaining injury.  This difference in probability of injury arises mostly from the large size of
the union workplace, the relative differences in incidence of raw injuries in the two
industries, and the male domination of the union worker’s employment unit.  These same
characteristics feed into actual injury rates per workplace, where the non-union worker fairs
much worse.  At her workplace, 31 workers per thousand sustain injury, compared with just
two per thousand on the assembly line.
Clearly, one should focus on the second column, since reducing injury rates will also
work toward creating more zero-injury workplaces, thereby thinning the probability values as
well.  Encouraging collectivism will reduce injury rates so long as it leads to union
recognition.  Debarring the pre-entry closed shop would do even more for attenuating injury
rates.  But, beware of the “middle ground” outcome of high density without a closed shop.
Where density exceeds 80%, the shop must be closed to prevent upward pressure on injury
rates.  Moreover, adversarial IR may be constructive in reducing injury rates, inasmuch as
industrial action proxies such an environment.  The same does not hold when managerial
attitude proxies for IR climate, though the absolute value of its coefficient is much smaller
than that belonging to industrial action.
Workplace size does not cut both ways as it may first appear.  Again, by focusing on
the second column, one realises by cultivating large workplaces, injury rates will fall.  This10
reduction in injury rates fully offsets the increase in probability of injury arising from
increasing workplace size, and will eventually decay even at the probability estimate.  That
male-dominated employment units yield greater accident rates only attaches greater impetus
to policies aiming to integrate females into the labour market and to desegregate jobs within
it.
Finally, injury rates can be reduced by allowing for co-determination regarding health
and safety, even in situations where IR may be otherwise characterised as adversarial.  Even
if unions and management quarrel over all other issues, labour possesses vital, tacit, shop
floor knowledge regarding health and safety, knowledge that is imperative for reducing
accident rates.
5. Conclusions
British trade unions lodge themselves in accident-prone workplaces and respond by reducing
rates of injury within these workplaces.  Only in situations where union density is above
80%, but without a closed shop, do unions assuredly fail at reducing accident rates.  Thus
while the paper succeeded in substantiating anecdotal evidence linking trade unions to
improved working conditions, it incorrectly hypothesised a monotonic, inverse relationship
between union instrumentality in the workplace and injury rates.
Studies aiming to build on this one must capture some of the other union methods for
ameliorating health and safety, such as inflated union compensating wage differentials for
risk.  Researchers must explore links to the product market, namely the notion that product
market power may affect workplace accident rates.  Bargaining arrangements may also make
a difference in the way unions transform information into action regarding workplace health
and safety.
Future research must incorporate measures of worker illness - the more germane type
of work-related ill health to consider when assessing the challenges facing workers in new,
“technological” workplaces.  Investment bankers and computer programmers may well suffer
from bone fractures, but illnesses such as stress and breathing difficulties urgently require
researchers to surmount the  mensural issues associated with relatively subjective illness
designations.  Reliance on individual surveys such as the Employment Department’s Labour
Force Survey or the individual employee survey incorporated into WERS98 provides a good
start for researchers, though neither data set would fully dispose of the imprecision associated
with the subjectivity, dispositionality, and delayed manifestation of illness.  For example,
certain workers may always feel “stressed” regardless of their occupation or may wrongfully
believe that problems associated with work caused or exacerbated their asthma, when in fact,
unfortunate genetics or problems at home caused the illness.  Additionally, the respondent
may still feel strains associated with previous employment, leading to the incorrect matching
of ailments with occupations, firms, or workplaces.
Finally, the public goods nature of union efforts to reduce workplace injury causes the
model to actually understate organised labour’s ability to reduce the incidence of industrial
injury.  In this study, the model dichotomously assigned variables of union strength to each
workplace, regardless of whether injuries occurred to union or non-union workers.  Thus, any
injury occurring to anyone at the workplace appears as a blot against trade unions.  However,
one would expect unions to establish a common “safety net” that would apply to all workers
in the employment unit regardless of union status.  Additionally, managers of non-union
workplaces will attempt to employ similar safety standards  to those of their union
competitors as a means of competing effectively in the labour market.  We can also expect11
these same managers to mimic union safety standards as a method of deterring union
organising—the so-called “union threat” and “union avoidance” effects typically discussed in
relation to the processes of wage determination.
Regardless of the apparent benefits, the dismantling of labour’s collective institutions
does not come without cost, namely in the form of an injury externality.  Granted, in the long
run, potential workers will demand excessive compensating wage differentials from
employers who do not offer a safe working environment, and employers will gradually
respond by shutting down, meeting risk differentials, or investing in safer capital.  However,
until the dawning of the laissez-faire labour market’s long run, trade unions serve as an


















Trade Unions and Likelihood of Occupational Injury
*
Independent Variables ¶F/¶x std. error




number of years establishment has been at this address and previous address
.0005
† .0002
Male Percentage of Labour Force (base case: less than 1/3)
males compose under 2/3 -.0040 .0350
males compose over 2/3 .1296
? .0423
Size of Workplace (base case: less than 25 workers)
less than 50 workers .1159
† .0519
more than 50 workers .2643
? .0377
Climate of Collective Bargaining
managerial attitude toward unions (1=union opposition)
-.0383 .0403
industrial action (1=occurred within the last 5 years)
.0761 .0518
Determination of Health and Safety
health and safety discussed by committee (1=affirmative)
.0385 .0346
health and safety discussed by JCC (1=affirmative)
.1088
? .0352
Industry Controls (base case: manufacturing)
electricity, gas, and water -.2573
? .0433
construction .0043 .0679
wholesale and retail -.0531 .0486
hotels and restaurants .3601
? .0588
















* The LHS variable for the converted probit is the binary variable set to equal one when an
observed workplace has had one or more employees suffer any one of the listed injuries
within the last 12 months.
† denotes variable significant at 5% level.
?  denotes variable significant at 1% level.14
Table 3
Trade Unions and Occupational Injury Rates
*
Independent Variables coefficient std. error
constant -2.7863
? .2594




number of years establishment has been at this address and previous address
.0015
¤ .0008
Male Percentage of Labour Force (base case: less than 1/3)
males compose under 2/3 -.0540 .1381
males compose over 2/3 .2618 .1700
Size of Workplace (base case: less than 25 workers)
less than 50 workers -.5348
† .2305
more than 50 workers -1.7620
? .2093
Climate of Collective Bargaining
managerial attitude toward unions (1=union opposition)
.0302 .1604
industrial action (1=occurred within the last 5 years)
-.2646 .1722
Determination of Health and Safety
health and safety discussed by committee (1=affirmative)
-.0639 .1196
health and safety discussed by JCC (1=affirmative)
-.1313 .1344
Industry Controls (base case: manufacturing)
electricity, gas, and water -.1815 .2898
construction .1853 .2260
wholesale and retail .2134 .1886
hotels and restaurants 1.2808
? .2059
transport and communications .3210 .2172
financial services -.7164 .4463













* The LHS variable is the natural logarithm of the injury rate at the workplace, defined as the
number of employees having sustained any of the listed injuries during working hours within
the last 12 months over the sum of part-time and full-time workers.
¤ denotes variable significant at 10% level.
† denotes variable significant at 5% level.
?  denotes variable significant at 1% level.15
Table 4
Trade Unions and Likelihood of Occupational Injury
*
Independent Variables ¶F/¶x std. error
Degree of Union Instrumentality (base case: no recognised unions)
recognition .0659
†  .0322
density above 80 percent .1002 .1283
post-entry closed shop .3390
† .1349
pre-entry closed shop -.1241 .1699
Industrial Vintage
number of years establishment has been at this address and previous address.
.0005
† .0003
Male Percentage of Labour Force (base case: less than 1/3)
males compose under 2/3 -.0098 .0355
males compose over 2/3 .1185
? .0429
Size of Workplace (base case: less than 25 workers)
less than 50 workers .1107
† .0521
more than 50 workers .2717
? .0379
Climate of Collective Bargaining
managerial attitude toward unions (1=union opposition)
-.0292 .0414
industrial action (1=occurred within the last 5 years)
.0833 .0524
Determination of Health and Safety
health and safety discussed by committee (1=affirmative)
.0417 .0352
health and safety discussed by JCC (1=affirmative)
.1088
? .0357
Industry Controls (base case: manufacturing)
electricity, gas, and water -.2504
? .0452
construction .0242 .0702
wholesale and retail -.0577 .0493
hotels and restaurants .3624
? .0595
















* The LHS variable for the converted probit is the binary variable set to equal one when an
observed workplace has had one or more employees suffer any one of the listed injuries
within the last 12 months.
¤ denotes variable significant at 10% level.
† denotes variable significant at 5% level.
?  denotes variable significant at 1% level.16
Table 5
Trade Unions and Occupational Injury Rates
*
Independent Variables coefficient std. error
constant -2.6857
? .2606
Degree of Union Instrumentality (base case: no recognised unions)
recognition -.2672
† .1186
density above 80 percent 1.1070
? .4210
post-entry closed shop -.1742 .4052
pre-entry closed shop -1.4006
¤ .8529
Industrial Vintage
number of years establishment has been at this address and previous address
.0010 .0009
Male Percentage of Labour Force (base case: less than 1/3)
males compose under 2/3 -.0534 .1380
males compose over 2/3 .2140 .1707
Size of Workplace (base case: less than 25 workers)
less than 50 workers -.5377
† .2294
more than 50 workers -1.7800
? .2081
Climate of Collective Bargaining
managerial attitude toward unions (1=union opposition)
.0050 .1608
industrial action (1=occurred within the last 5 years)
-.2671 .1715
Determination of Health and Safety
health and safety discussed by committee (1=affirmative)
-.0741 .1200
health and safety discussed by JCC (1=affirmative)
-.1174 .1346
Industry Controls (base case: manufacturing)
electricity, gas, and water -.1996 .2932
construction .1291 .2262
wholesale and retail .1604 .1894
hotels and restaurants 1.2202
? .2071
















* The LHS variable is the natural logarithm of the injury rate at the workplace, defined as the number of
employees having sustained any of the listed injuries during working hours within the last 12 months over the
sum of part-time and full-time workers.
¤ denotes variable significant at 10% level.
† denotes variable significant at 5% level.
?  denotes variable significant at 1% level.17
Table 6
PROTOTYPICAL WORKERS AND OCCUPATIONAL INJURY
 
union assembly line worker & non-union merchant
banker
 
probability of injury injuries per 1000 workers
“union”
(i) 0.5762 2.3435




(i)  “union” worker: pre-entry closed shop, 50 year-old workplace,
over 2/3 male, more than 50 workers, poor IR climate, health and
safety committees, and health and safety JCCs
(ii) “non-union” worker: no unions recognised, 2 year-old workplace,
less than 1/3 male, less than 25 workers, no signs of poor IR, no
health and safety committees or JCCs18
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